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Fine-Tuned of Necessity?1 
 
Ben Page  
University of Durham 
benjamin.t.page@durham.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to explicate and analyse an alternative response to fine-tuning arguments 
from those that are typically given, namely, design or brute contingency. The response I 
explore is based on necessity, the necessitarian response. After showing how necessity blocks 
the argument, I explicate the reply I claim necessitarians can give, and suggest how its three 
requirements can be met. Firstly that laws are metaphysically necessary, secondly that 
constants are metaphysically necessary, and thirdly that the fundamental properties which 
determine the laws and constants are necessary. After discussing each in turn, I end the paper 
by assessing how the response fares when running the fine-tuning argument in two ways, as 
an inference to best explanation and as a Bayesian argument. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fine-tuning arguments for theism generally run as follows.2 First, we are told that in order for 
life to exist, very precise laws of nature, constants of nature, and initial conditions are 
required,3 without which life would be impossible.4 Advocates then contend that design is the 
best explanation or most likely hypothesis for these requirements being met as opposed to 
alternatives. Collins, the most prominent contemporary advocate, canvasses one alternative, 
brute contingency, where this answer takes two forms, either a “naturalistic single-universe 
hypothesis … the existence of which is an unexplained, brute given”, or the “naturalistic 
multiverse hypothesis” (2009, 204).5 I would like to avoid brute contingency responses to the 
                                                     
1 I wish to acknowledge a number of people who have aided me in producing this paper, both through reading 
earlier drafts and in conversation. As such I wish to thank, in no particular order, Martin Smith, William Mander, 
Ralph Walker, Alastair Wilson, Gregory Stacey, Martin Pickup, Anna Marmodoro, Matthew Tugby, Sophie Allen, 
Calum Miller, Max Baker-Hytch, Yoaav Isaacs, and the reviewers of this journal. 
2 Note from the outset that, following standard practice, I do not mean to imply any kind of deliberative action 
on behalf of an agent by the language of ‘fine-tuning’. 
3 For a detailed explication of what I mean by ‘precise’ see: (Hawthorne & Isaacs, 2018). 
4 Collins (2009, 211-222) gives examples of laws, constants and initial conditions as evidence of fine-tuning, 
whilst Swinburne (2004, 172) only uses laws and initial conditions, and Hawthorne and Isaacs (2018) only 
constants. 
5 Swinburne (2004, 153-191) does likewise, whilst Leslie (1989) gives necessitarianism an extremely brief 
mention. 
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argument and have nothing further to say about them here; rather the aim is to explicate and 
assess an alternative reply based on necessity, the necessitarian response.6 
 
For the purpose of introduction, the necessitarian response, put simply, says the laws and 
constants of nature are metaphysically necessary, such that they do not vary across possible 
worlds.7 Yet since the fine-tuning argument requires contingency, given necessitarianism, the 
argument fails. Van Inwagen has recently suggested that this reply is “much more interesting 
than the [brute contingency option]” (2015, 206), yet ultimately he finds it wholly 
unpersuasive. (2017, 207) Oppy also gives it briefly as an option for blocking the argument if 
one “supposes that every possible world ‘shares an initial part’ with the actual world” (2013a, 
27; 2016, 33). Given that Oppy appears to hold this, that every possible world shares an initial 
part (2013b, 47), we can take him to think necessitarianism persuasively causes problems for 
the fine-tuning argument.8 Despite this and given the increasing interest of necessitarianism  
within the metaphysics of science, the response has never been sufficiently explored and this 
is something I seek to rectify here. 
 
Before outlining the structure of the paper, I must first note that I will only deal with two 
aspects of fine-tuning, laws and constants, therefore neglecting initial conditions. I do this for 
three reasons: firstly, because Bird (2014, 285-289) has recently given a necessitarian account 
of these conditions; secondly, in order to account for this data my proposal would require 
extra elements that need defending which I am unable to do here9; and finally, since some 
have questioned whether initial conditions should be thought of as distinct from laws (Sklar, 
1984; 1990; Frisch, 2004). The response therefore only explicitly attempts to deal with the 
data of fine-tuning related to the laws and constants of nature. 
 
In order to lay out fully and assess the necessitarian response, the structure of the paper will 
be as follows. I start by showing why fine-tuning requires contingency, and why necessity 
might be thought to block the argument. Subsequently I formulate the response 
necessitarians can give, suggesting that three requirements need to be met: firstly that laws 
are metaphysically necessary, secondly that constants are metaphysically necessary, and 
thirdly that the fundamental properties which determine the laws and constants are 
necessary. I discuss each of these elements in turn, suggesting how one might argue for them, 
before ending the paper by assessing how the response fares when running the fine-tuning 
argument in two ways, as an inference to the best explanation and as a Bayesian argument. 
                                                     
6 The necessitarian response could also come in a multi-verse variety, and this may cause distinct problems for 
the argument not addressed here since I focus on a single-universe account. 
7 They are therefore necessary in a de re rather than de dicto sense. 
8 Oppy (2013a; 2013b) thinks a similar move can be made against certain cosmological arguments, see Leftow 
(2017) for a reply; some of the comments made by Leftow would also be applicable to the necessitarian picture 
examined in this paper. 
9 Namely the necessity of the initial quantity and place of properties. 
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1. The Requirement of Contingency for Fine-Tuning 
 
A major assumption behind fine-tuning arguments is that finely-tuned aspects of nature could 
have been otherwise; that is the laws and constants of nature, at least those related to fine-
tuning, are contingent.10 This assumption is one that typical respondents who advocate 
design and brute contingency usually take for granted. Those who advocate the design 
hypothesis presumably think the instantiated design of nature could have been otherwise, 
and similarly those adopting a brute contingency position, be that of a single universe or 
multiverse, allow for the possibility that a different brute contingent could have been 
instantiated. The necessitarian, by contrast, denies this initial assumption, claiming it isn’t 
possible that the laws and constants have been otherwise; they are necessary.11 
 
Before spelling out why this blocks the other responses, it is important to understand the 
types of necessity used throughout this paper. First is narrow logical necessity, where the 
“truths of propositional logic and first order quantification theory” (Plantinga, 1974, 1) are 
what is necessary in this sense. Next is broad logical necessity or metaphysical necessity, 
which Fine (2005, 236) characterises as “the sense of necessity that obtains in virtue of the 
identity of things”.12 Kripke provides some examples of this type of necessity when he claims 
Hesperus is necessarily identical with Phosphorous (1980, 108-110), and Gold necessarily has 
the atomic number 79 (1980, 123-125). It is thus because of what Hesperus is that it is 
necessarily identical to Phosphorus, with the same being said for Gold and its atomic number 
79. Metaphysical necessity then, concerns “being and its modes, whereas logic [and thereby 
logical necessity], properly understood, does not concern being in general but rather, the 
formal properties of and relations between propositions”. (Lowe, 1999, 10)13 Finally, there is 
nomic or physical necessity, which holds in virtue of the laws of nature. However, unlike the 
prior necessities this necessity is relativized from world to world, since it is assumed that 
different possible worlds could have different laws. For the rest of the paper the necessity 
                                                     
10 Perhaps a different type of argument to theism could be run without assuming this, that is where the laws 
and constants are necessary. I suggest one below but note that it is far weaker than the standard fine-tuning 
argument. 
11 That they are necessary may not mean that there is no sense in which we can say the laws and constants are 
fine-tuned. For instance, suppose we found out, perhaps due to computer modelling, that the range of laws and 
constants that are life permitting is very small, and then also found out that the laws and constants that hold in 
this world hold in every possible world. There is still a sense in which the life permitting range of laws and 
constants is small, and therefore fine-tuned, even though it is impossible that any other laws or constants hold. 
However, this paper in no way relies upon this point, and if one thinks the language of fine-tuning no longer 
should be used when the laws and constants are necessary then one can re-word what I say at various points 
without loss of content. 
12 For more on the distinction between logical and metaphysical necessity see: Kripke (1980); Plantinga (1974, 
1-9); Lowe (1999, 8-22); Leftow (2012, 33-38); Fine (2005). 
13 However, despite what is said here, and the examples of metaphysical necessity given, as Gendler and 
Hawthorne (2002, 4) write the notion “is standardly taken to be primitive.” 
 4 
that will most concern us is broadly logical/metaphysical necessity, and unless otherwise 
stated this is what I will refer to.14 
 
How then does necessity block the argument? The fine-tuning argument asks for either an 
explanation or most likely hypothesis behind the fine-tuning data, where all the data is 
assumed contingent, that is could have been otherwise. But if the fine-tuning is necessary 
then it cannot vary across metaphysically possible worlds. The laws and constants would 
never vary and hence aren’t contingent.15 The necessitarian therefore denies the contingency 
claim inherent in the argument and replies that the laws and constants are metaphysically 
necessary; nothing further is needed.16 
 
I think many theists should think this response less terrible than many previously have, even 
if they ultimately think it unsuccessful. The reason for this change of heart is that the response 
mirrors many theistic answers concerning explanations of God’s existence. Paralleling the 
necessitarian, who holds that the laws and constants are broadly logically/metaphysically 
necessary, “most analytic philosophers hold that if God exists, He exists with broad logical 
necessity.” (Leftow, 2010, 141) More importantly, theists who suppose God exists with this 
type of necessity also typically claim that appealing to metaphysical necessity is sufficient for 
ending explanatory chains, evidenced in responses to questions such as ‘what explains God’s 
existence?’ For instance, Plantinga writes, 
 
“perhaps a necessary being may be characterized as (a) a being such that some 
statement referring to it can properly serve as a final answer in this sort of question 
and answer series, an answer which puts an end to the series. … such a being must be 
one about which the question "Why does it exist?" does not arise or cannot sensibly 
be asked. A necessary being, therefore, may be further characterized as (b) a being 
about which one cannot sensibly ask why it exists. When the theist, therefore, asserts 
that God is the necessary being, we may construe his remark in the following way. He 
is pointing out that we cannot sensibly ask, "Why is it that God exists?"” (1967, 181-
182) 
 
                                                     
14 Craig (2008, 161-164) thinks the necessity necessitarians will appeal to is physical necessity. Perhaps a 
necessitarian could respond in this way, however I think targeting metaphysical necessity is the best option. The 
reason for this is that since I take physical necessity to hold in virtue of the laws of nature, I cannot claim the 
laws of nature themselves are necessary in this sense. Perhaps one could claim that the constants and initial 
conditions are determined by the laws of nature and therefore hold with this type of necessity, but I do not opt 
for this view here. The second reason I opt for metaphysical necessity is that it falls out of certain positions taken 
in modal metaphysics.  
15 An objection might immediately present itself, namely that I can conceive that the laws and constants are 
different and therefore it is possible that they are different. This is perhaps the most important objection to the 
view and will be discussed once the response is set out more fully. 
16 Van Inwagen (2015, 208) seems to agree that this is sufficient for blocking the argument. 
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The necessitarian follows Plantinga in all he says, but substitutes laws and constants for God. 
If the laws and constants are necessary then it is difficult to see any explanatory differences 
between the two, and hence necessity, if plausible, undercuts the argument; or at least 
theists who endorse the move made above by Plantinga should think so. 
 
2. The Proposal 
 
But you are likely thinking, this is all well and good, necessity might block the argument, but 
the real question is whether it is plausible.17 It therefore seems time to start providing some 
reasons for thinking that it is. Briefly the necessitarian proposal I explicate says, the laws of 
nature are metaphysically necessary, as too are the constants, and that the instantiation of 
the properties that determine these laws and constants is also necessary. This final 
component is especially important since one could think both the laws and constants are 
metaphysically necessary, and yet also that they could have been different.18 Before looking 
at the elements of the proposal in detail, I should note that the view of laws and constants I 
set out will require that the world is composed of dispositional properties,19 a view that has 
received much attention in recent years (Bird, 2007; Marmodoro, 2010; Groff & Greco, 2013; 
Jacobs, 2017). 
 
Dispositions/powers/potencies/capacities are entities that have their causal role essentially 
such that they cannot vary across possible worlds. For instance, take the dispositional 
property being negatively charged. As a dispositional property the identity of this property is 
defined in terms of its causal role, for instance repelling other negatively charged entities. 
Given this, one could not have the dispositional property negative charge, and have it attract 
other negatively charged entities. A property that did this would just be a different one, not 
the disposition negative charge. This contrasts the other popular conception of properties, 
categoricalism, which rejects the link between a property’s causal role and its identity, instead 
thinking a property’s nature is “self-contained, [and] distinct from the powers that they 
                                                     
17 A reviewer suggests that merely establishing the possibility of necessitarianism is enough to cause problems 
for fine-tuning arguments, since the burden of proof will be on the proponent of fine-tuning arguments to refute 
necessitarianism. This may be correct, although the possibility to be established will need to be the metaphysical 
rather than epistemic possibility. However, in the literature it is the lack of plausibility of the view that seems to 
be the concern regarding necessitarianism, rather than its impossibility. As such, here I try to suggest why one 
might think it is plausible, but if one wishes to follow the reviewers thought, then one may read the remainder 
of the paper as my trying to merely show that necessitarianism is possible. 
18 How one could think this I hope will become clearer as the paper proceeds, but put briefly, if a properties 
identity determines what laws and constants are then it is metaphysically necessary that given the existence of 
these properties there are these laws and constants. As such the laws and constants are metaphysically 
necessary given the properties that exist, but it is a further question whether the existence of the properties 
themselves are metaphysically necessary. This is why necessary instantiation is also required for the 
necessitarian response I give. 
19 Perhaps necessitarianism does not require this, but my version will. 
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bestow.” (Armstrong, 1997, 69) Thus, unlike dispositions, categorical properties have a causal 
role that varies across possible worlds, and as such requires quidditism, where each property 
has a primitive identity that enables it to have different causal roles across possible worlds 
whilst retaining its identity. Given this, reusing our property of negative charge, a 
categoricalist would claim that this property has a quiddity which provides it with a primitive 
identity such that negative charge could take on radically different causal roles in other 
possible worlds, for instance attracting other negatively charged entities, smelling of roses, 
or tasting of chocolate. The necessitarian view I explicate will rely upon the assumption that 
all worldly causal efficacy is in some way due to dispositions, and hence dispositions will play 
a key role in the account of laws and constants.20 I don’t try to defend a realist view of 
dispositions and their universal scope here, since this is a task that has been undertaken 
elsewhere, and given this my reliance on dispositions should not be seen as an ad hoc 
postulate. 
 
2. 1 Necessary Laws of Nature 
 
Turning to the necessitarian view, the dispositionalist account holds that laws are 
metaphysically necessary.21 However, other accounts of the metaphysics of laws endow laws 
with differing modal status. The easiest way of showing why dispositionalists think laws are 
necessary is by contrasting them with full contingency accounts (Humean) and partial 
contingency accounts (strong external governing laws). 
 
The Humean empiricist position, following the traditional reading of Hume, holds that there 
are no connections in nature and that laws merely describe the regularities observable in the 
world. Nothing determines that something does X or Y, rather X or Y happens and laws simply 
describe those regularities. As such, no necessity is involved in laws. Everything is contingent 
and everything could have been otherwise. Thus, fine-tuning arguments presumably work on 
Humeanism since it appears that different regularities could have occurred, some leading to 
life-prohibiting worlds and others to life-permitting. Despite this, Humeans might shrug their 
shoulders at fine-tuning data, saying ‘there is no explanation of the data.’ They can say this 
because given empiricism we need not think there is an explanation as to why the laws are as 
they are since thinking this is an import of rationalism and is therefore something many 
empiricists won’t accept. Hence the fine-tuning argument only works on Humeanism if one 
also has a little bit of rationalistic blood.22 Realists about dispositions have had much to say 
about Humeanism recently and ultimately reject it since they think laws are more than mere 
                                                     
20 Thus, one could hold a dualist, dual-aspect or monistic view concerning dispositional properties. 
21 At least nearly all of those I know of who are realists about dispositions as fundamental properties do. I will 
state what this claim entails shortly. 
22 This is only an escape for Humeans, since the other positions are rationalistic enough. 
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descriptions of regularities,23 instead thinking that laws act with some type of necessity 
(Mumford, 2004; Ellis, 2001). 
 
The second view of laws is associated with Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong (Dretske, 1977; Tooley, 
1977; Armstrong, 1983) and the anti-reductionist positions of Carroll (1994) and Lange 
(2000),24 what I call the strong-external-governing conception. Briefly put laws are necessary 
connections within this world, either between universals or tropes, but this necessity does 
not carry across possible worlds. One reason for adopting this type of necessity is due to a 
thought experiment which in its simplest form asks us to imagine a world with all the same 
properties but different laws. For instance, take ‘water/H2O’, either as a universal or trope, 
and assume in this world it is nomically linked with the universal or trope ‘boils at 100°C’. The 
idea behind the thought experiment is that it is merely a contingent fact that ‘water’ is linked 
with ‘boils at 100°C’, since we can imagine that ‘water’ could have been linked with ‘boils at 
112°C’ or ‘boils at 58°C’. Different possible worlds will have different boiling points of water, 
not because the normal conditions are different, but because the nomic link is different. If we 
can imagine something like this, the thought continues, then laws and properties are distinct. 
As a result, the laws could have been different and the properties the same, the properties 
different and the laws the same, or both could have been different.25  
 
The thought experiment is supposed to motivate one into rejecting Humean contingency but 
doesn’t force full-blown necessity. Rather it suggests a distinct type of necessity, what 
Armstrong (2010, 41) calls “an intermediate necessity, indeterminate between Humean 
contingency and necessity … ‘nomic necessity’”. Although notoriously difficult to work out 
exactly what this kind of necessity is (Lewis, 1983, 366), this account of laws also allows the 
fine-tuning argument to run without issue since the laws could have been different. For 
instance, different possible worlds will have different boiling points for water, not because 
the conditions are different, but because the nomic link is different. The defender of the fine-
tuning argument to theism can then extrapolate this to instances of fine-tuning they are 
interested in and the argument is off and running. 
 
Dispositionalists also reject this view since they find categorical properties, which this position 
seems to require, objectionable and therefore think the thought experiment given above 
which motivates this position, does not describe a genuine possibility.26 Instead they hold that 
each causal property has a dispositional essence, something the property is necessarily 
                                                     
23 Simpson (2017) argues against those who try to combine Humeanism and a realist view of dispositions. 
24 Carroll and Lange think laws are metaphysically contingent in the way I describe, but they don’t explicate the 
necessary connection since they are anti-reductionists. 
25 For further elaboration on this thought experiment see: Tooley (1977); Carroll (1994, 77-85). 
26 For further critical discussion see: Mumford (2004); Ellis (2001); Bird (2007). 
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directed towards, where this gives a property its identity.27 Thus, if one tried to rip the 
directionality out of a disposition, the rupture would be so great that the property itself would 
no longer exist. Its identity would have fundamentally changed, with a different property 
coming to exist instead. Due to this, unlike the previous views, dispositionalists think that if 
you had the same properties instantiated across possible worlds the laws would be identical. 
Only with different properties do you get different laws. 
 
Nonetheless, this shouldn’t concern the fine-tuning argument because even if laws are 
metaphysically necessary given the properties in the world, the instantiation of those 
dispositional properties is not, and this fact enables the argument to get going. Contingency 
has found another opening, with Schmass possibly being instantiated rather than mass. A 
further distinction therefore is needed between weak and strong necessitarianism. The weak 
necessitarian thinks “Laws concern properties. Properties may or may not exist in different 
possible worlds. … the law L(P) concerning property P is necessary, and that this requires only 
that L(P) holds in all possible worlds where P exists.” (Bird, 2004, 257) By contrast strong 
necessitarianism says “there is no difference between possible worlds as regards their laws; 
nomologically, they are identical.” (Bird, 2004, 259) Since the dispositionalist position I have 
explicated doesn’t decide between these positions, we must decide ourselves. In the section 
concerning the necessity of instantiation I suggest how one might argue for strong 
necessitarianism, as it is this which is required for the necessitarian response to fine-tuning. 
 
2.2 Necessary Constants  
 
Having seen why we could think that laws are metaphysically necessary, we must move onto 
constants. However, before proceeding I should note that there is often a terminological 
difference between physicists and philosophers here that can be confusing. In my reading in 
philosophy of science one rarely reads about the constants of nature as distinct from laws,28 
but this distinction often appears in discussions of fine-tuning and physics. Philosopher of 
physics Wallace is informative in explaining how we should understand this difference 
between the disciplines writing,  
 
“for most philosophers of science, a law of nature is something like the inverse-square 
law, including the gravitational constant. However, physicists usually regard the 
constants as parameters that can be set within the laws, leading to the distinction 
between constants and laws. But that doesn’t in itself commit to the constants having 
any contingent status. I think it’s best – when thinking about current physics, at any 
rate – to think of the constants as having the same nomic status as the laws.”29  
                                                     
27 Some think of this directedness as relational in terms of an essential relation, whilst others think of it as non-
relational. Either notion is acceptable for the necessitarian. 
28 One notable exception is Collins (2005, 388-391). 
29 David Wallace in personal correspondence. 
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If this is correct, then perhaps many of those philosophers of science who embrace 
dispositionalism might also think the constants of nature possess the same type of necessity 
as the laws, since constants are contained within laws. This would be a quick and easy way to 
argue that the constants are metaphysically necessary, merely in virtue of the laws being 
metaphysically necessary. However, it is not one I suspect all will agree with, for instance 
Collins (2005, 388-389), and therefore I attempt to spell out the metaphysics as to why 
dispositionalists might think constants are necessary, something yet to be done in the 
literature. 
 
When explaining why the laws are metaphysically necessary on dispositionalism, I relied upon 
the essential directionality inherent in dispositions.  In order to explain the constants, I rely 
upon another aspect of dispositions I take to be essential, their intensity (Manley & 
Wasserman, 2007; Vetter, 2015, ch.3).30 It is clear that different dispositions have different 
intensities, for example different acids have different pH levels and different types of glass 
shatter more or less easily. Further, we can give parallel reasons for intensity being an 
essential aspect of dispositions as those we gave for directionality, particularly since “the 
degree or intensity of a power [disposition] is clearly a causally relevant matter” (Mumford & 
Anjum, 2011, 26). Intensity, then, plays a key role in determining a property’s identity, such 
that if the intensity of a property changed it would be a different property. For instance, if the 
pH level of a property changed it would no longer be the same specific property because it 
would have a different dispositional essence.31 Thus, just as directionality is essential to 
dispositional properties, so too is intensity, such that the same property cannot vary in its 
directionality or intensity across possible worlds. 
 
Given this, what are the constants of nature on a dispositionalist viewpoint?32 The 
gravitational constant, for example, is the intensity of the relation between acceleration and 
mass. The same determinate mass accelerates at the same rate every time it is instantiated, 
but were the constant to change, this rate would be different. This relationship is fixed as a 
matter of necessity for mass and acceleration. The result of this is that wherever mass and 
acceleration are instantiated, we will have the same gravitational constant. That is, the 
gravitational constant will not have any contingent value, but rather a metaphysically 
necessary value given the dispositional natures of mass and acceleration. The only way for 
                                                     
30 Just as with directedness (note 27), how intensity is related to dispositions is disputed. If one thinks of it 
externally, then since I later adopt holism this shouldn’t cause any problems, given necessary instantiation. 
Alternatively, if one thinks intensity is intrinsic to dispositions, where this is how much effect a disposition has, 
one need not adopt holism. 
31 We might be able to say it is a similar property to be before since it might still have the pH level such that it is 
still acidic, however different acids have different properties. 
32 I owe the proceeding thought to Allen who comes close to explicitly endorsing this view elsewhere (2007, 
113). 
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the constant to change would be if Schmass were instantiated, since then the ratios between 
acceleration and Schmass would be different to those between acceleration and mass. 
Constants, then, on this view are therefore nothing other than ratios of intensities between 
dispositional properties.33 
 
Assuming this way of linking a disposition’s intensity with the constants of nature, the 
constants turn out to be metaphysically necessary. Nonetheless, just like the dispositionalist 
position concerning laws of nature, the way to interpret the necessity of these constants 
comes in two varieties, weak and strong necessitarianism.34 As before, strong 
necessitarianism, and hence necessary instantiation is required, and it is to this we now turn. 
 
2.3 Necessary Property Instantiation 
 
Dispositionalism gives us at least weak necessitarianism, but strong necessitarianism is 
required for a necessitarian response. That is, we need it to be the case that not only given 
certain properties certain laws and constants necessarily obtain, but also that the properties 
that determine the fundamental laws and constants are necessarily instantiated. As such, 
strong necessitarianism seems to require necessary property instantiation. Therefore, I here 
suggest how one might make the case for this aspect of the strong necessitarian position, 
given that this is a view that is embraced and defended by a number of contemporary 
thinkers.35 
 
One argument some have made in favour of strong necessitarianism has been based on 
adopting a Platonic conception of properties. Thus, Bird writes, “we should think of properties 
as themselves being necessary existents, as would be appropriate on the Platonic (ante rem) 
conception of universals ... If that is the case then … every possible property exists in every 
possible world, and so every possible law holds in every possible world.” (2014, 285) What 
should we think of this type of reason? Whilst it seems Platonism happily accounts for laws 
and constants being the same in every possible world, it doesn’t entail that the same worldly 
properties are instantiated in every possible world. The type of strong necessitarianism I 
require needs the further claim that a certain subset of the world’s properties are necessarily 
instantiated. Platonism therefore gets us only halfway, providing necessary properties but 
                                                     
33 Livanios (2014) critically discusses some problems for a dispositionalist view of constants but does not think 
of them as I suggest here. 
34 Dispositionalists may be asked further questions concerning the relationship between determinate and 
determinable laws and constants. This is something I bracket here but note that dispositionalists have sought to 
address this concern elsewhere (Tugby, manuscript). 
35 For instance: Bird (2004; 2007, 50-59; 2014); Wilson (2013; manuscript); Bostock (2003); Oppy (2013b, 47); 
Smith (2001). The following list of scholars might also hold to strong necessitarianism, but their work leaves their 
adherence ambiguous: Leeds (2001; 2007); Edgington (2004); Vetter (2015). 
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not necessary instantiation, where reasons for adopting this missing element will be given 
shortly. 
 
Another argument others have proposed for strong necessitarianism makes use of current 
debates over modal truthmakers. In recent years a new position has emerged which some 
have termed ‘hardcore actualism’ (Contessa, 2010). This theory is actualist rather than 
possibilist but distinguishes itself from ‘softcore actualism’ in that its modal truthmakers are 
natural objects rather than abstracta, such as states of affairs or propositions. Because of this, 
the view is often characterised as Aristotelian rather than Platonic, where the dispositionalist 
version has it that the dispositions instantiated in this world provide the truthmakers of all 
metaphysical possibilities.36 On this view, what makes it true that I could have been a 
professional tennis player is that a whole complex array of dispositions in the actual world 
could have manifested in a way that brought this about. However, due to the Aristotelian 
nature of this view, those alien properties that are unable to be brought about by the 
manifestation of worldly instantiated dispositions, what Vetter (2015, 269) calls ‘super-alien 
properties’, are deemed impossible. Thus, if the actual world contains dispositions that if 
manifested would produce a unicorn, then unicorns are possible. However, if the dispositions 
of this world are unable to bring about such a thing, then being a unicorn is a super-alien 
property and impossible. Some will no doubt be unhappy with such a consequence since they 
wish to allow for such super-alien possibilities, and thereby a greater range of metaphysical 
possibilities (Tugby, 2015). Yet why should we allow for them? As Borghini and Williams write, 
 
“The objection being raised is that dispositionalism is somehow inadequate as an 
account of metaphysical possibility because it does not treat S as possible [for instance 
the thought experiment those advocating the strong-external-governing conception 
of laws appeal too]. But why should it? Not every logically possible state of affairs will 
turn out to be metaphysically possible. The space of actual dispositional properties 
divides the set of all logically possible states of affairs into two groups: those that are 
metaphysically possible and those that are not. … speaking of the possibilities we 
‘need’ is very odd indeed. This implies that we know what is metaphysically possible, 
and that it is the task of an ontologically motivated account like dispositionalism to 
provide the truthmakers for that set of possibilities. This puts the cart before the 
horse.” (2008, 37) 
 
Additionally, many dispositionalists are unconcerned by the reduction of the modal 
landscape, since they claim that in order to adequately account for super-alien properties and 
be an actualist, one must employ abstracta to account for certain modal truths. Thus Vetter 
writes, “it is not too hard to bite the bullet here, since the bullet is part of an attractive picture 
of properties … [rather than] appeal to Platonist universals or propositions” (2015, 270). The 
                                                     
36 For further explication of this view see: Jacobs (2010); Borghini & Williams (2008); Vetter (2015); Pawl (2017). 
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super-alien properties complaint, therefore, does not seem to me to be an overwhelming 
worry,37 although providing arguments to the effect that these properties are impossible 
would certainly strengthen the hardcore-actualist cause.38 
 
Nonetheless, just as Platonism was incomplete in providing a strong necessitarian account so 
too is hardcore actualism. Platonism required the extra thesis of necessary instantiation, 
because even though all properties exist across all possible worlds, the properties that are 
instantiated could vary. Hardcore actualism needs something similar since presumably there 
could have been fewer properties in the world,39 and this might cause a problem for a strong 
necessitarian solution.40 Therefore we need some positive reasons for adopting a principle of 
necessary instantiation for those fundamental properties that determine nature’s laws and 
constants. 
 
One reason is due to the following thought. Suppose you think there should be a reason that 
these specific properties, and hence these particular laws and constants, are instantiated. It 
seems that holding that they are necessary gives a satisfactory answer to this question. The 
reason for this parallels the thought as to why necessity is an adequate response to the fine-
tuning argument, namely because necessity is able to stop explanatory chains whilst positing 
brute contingents is not. Thus, if the instantiation of these properties is necessary, then asking 
why these properties exist is just like asking why God exists when He is metaphysically 
necessary. If, however, one were to adopt weak necessitarianism, the reason that these 
properties rather than others exist would be contingent, as if the reason were necessary it 
would make everything else within this chain of reasoning necessary.41 But then we would be 
left with a brute contingent fact as to why these laws hold and not others. A theistic weak 
necessitarian might have an easy answer here if one grants that libertarian free acts can be 
explanation stoppers, since they might hold that it is in virtue of God’s free decision that these 
properties are instantiated rather than others.42 But non-theistic weak necessitarians, in 
order to avoid strong necessitarianism, will have to remain content with brute contingent 
instantiation.  
 
Given that I’m trying to provide a response not based on brute contingency, necessary 
instantiation looks preferable if we think there should be a reason why these properties 
rather than others are instantiated. As Bird writes, strong necessitarianism provides “an 
explanation of sorts. Being necessary, the fundamental laws could not have been otherwise 
                                                     
37 Dorr (2008, 47) makes a similar point for nominalists. 
38 Armstrong (1989) in the past tried to make an argument like this. 
39 Although Pawl (2017, 118-120) suggests this is questionable. 
40 Unless the properties remaining provide a very high probability for permitting life. Yet this provides a slightly 
different type of response to fine-tuning than the necessitarian one. 
41 Parallel to a common objection to the principle of sufficient reason (van Inwagen, 1983, 202-204). 
42 For a defence of this see: Pruss (2006, 126-159). 
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… we cannot ask for an explanation of the usual kind at all, for the comparative question, ‘why 
do we have these laws as opposed to some other set?’, assumes what is false, that some other 
set is possible.” (2007, 59) Many theists should be on board with everything said here, other 
than the conclusion, since the motivation behind thinking properties are necessary is very 
similar to the motivation behind postulating God as an explanation of everything. Theists 
often complain about those who refuse to look for deeper explanations and instead posit 
contingent primitive brute facts. As such they should welcome Bird’s insistence that we dig 
towards deeper explanations. Further, since it is the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) that 
is doing the work in this argument, with this being something theists regularly rely upon, they 
should also look favourably upon this. 
  
A second reason one might adopt necessary instantiation is based on another consideration 
prized by some theists and many contemporary metaphysicians, namely simplicity or 
parsimony.43 Strong necessitarianism is a simple view, particularly when considering the 
ontology of laws and constants, as only dispositions are needed. Further, as I will discuss 
below, if holism is true then it may be that only one dispositional property needs to be 
necessary since it will necessarily bring with it all the other properties, and as such there need 
only one necessary being, much like the monotheists necessary God.44 There is also no need 
for differing types of necessity on strong necessitarianism because there is no longer any 
physical or nomic necessity, and unlike weak necessitarianism no contingency related to the 
instantiation of those properties related to laws and constants. Thus, if simplicity is seen as 
virtuous then strong necessitarianism is on solid grounds.45 
 
A third reason for adopting necessary instantiation is that some think it avoids the notorious 
difficulties that plague modal epistemology.46 Thus Wilson writes, for the strong necessitarian 
“modal epistemology is continuous with ordinary epistemology. … Far from presenting a 
problem for modal [strong] necessitarianism, the unification of modal epistemology with 
general scientific epistemology that it involves is one of the strongest points in its favour. 
Modal [strong] necessitarians require no special epistemology for modal truths, and they 
need not rely on the problematic conceivability-possibility link.” (2013, 665) Given this virtue, 
                                                     
43 For instance, Schaffer (2015, 644) writes “Do not multiply entities without necessity! Few principles are as 
pervasive in contemporary metaphysics.” In theistic debates Swinburne (2004) is perhaps the greatest advocate 
of simplicity. I suggest the reason ontological parsimony is prized so highly is so to avoid postulating many brutes.  
44 Perhaps this goes someway to block Leftow’s (2017, 328-332) thought that theists still have the advantage 
over the number and nature of fundamental entities when considering parsimony. For on both accounts there 
is only one in number and one in nature, with everything else being derivative on both accounts, e.g. God’s 
thoughts might be many and of a different nature to God but they are not fundamental. Nonetheless, it should 
be acknowledged that whilst adding holism to the account isn’t a significant cost, it nonetheless has some cost.  
45 Wilson (2013, 660-661) argues that strong necessitarianism also has the virtue of simplicity when addressing 
the argument from sustaining counterfactuals, since the answer why the counterfactually nearest worlds tend 
to have the same laws as the actual world is simply because all worlds have the same laws. 
46 For elaboration of some of these difficulties see: van Inwagen (1998). 
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we have another reason for preferring the strong necessitarian position to its weak 
necessitarian rival. 
 
Holism also could provide one with grounds for thinking that if one fundamental property is 
necessary then all fundamental properties will be due to the interdependence of properties. 
For as Schaffer writes, “If everything is internallyessential related … Everything will be 
interdependent in a very strong sense — if one thing were to fail to exist, then everything 
would fail to exist.” (2010a, 349) The position I spell out here doesn’t require that everything 
is interdependent, but only that those things involved within the causal realm are—those 
things which account for the laws and constants of nature. I will have more to say about 
holism later, but for now it should be noted that holism fits incredibly well with a 
dispositionalist theory of things, and therefore this appeal should not be seen in any way as 
ad hoc.47 Thus, for strong necessitarianism to work one might only need to think that one 
property is necessarily instantiated, perhaps space-time (Dasgupta, 2016, 398), with holism 
carrying all the other required properties with it.  
 
Given all this, necessary instantiation, and therefore strong necessitarianism, has a number 
of arguments in its favour, relying on considerations based on the principle of sufficient 
reason, simplicity, modal epistemology, and holism. Maybe there are further reasons one 
could give for this view, and this is something I think deserves further investigation.48 
However, what should be noted here is that there are some sensible reasons for holding to 
necessary instantiation and therefore strong necessitarianism. As such, strong 
necessitarianism seems to be a plausible option concerning the modal status of the laws and 
constants of nature. 
 
 2.4 The Proposal Summarised 
 
Summarising, the proposal holds that the world is dispositional, at least in its causal aspects, 
and as such the laws and constants of nature are metaphysically necessary. Further, since we 
have seen that reasonable grounds can be given for adopting necessary instantiation we 
arrive at strong necessitarianism. This leads us to an alternative response to the fine-tuning 
argument. That is, despite its initial appearances the fine-tuning data couldn’t have been 
otherwise because they are necessary, and as such the fine-tuning argument cannot get going 
given its reliance on contingency. 
 
3. Inference to Best Explanation Fine-Tuning Arguments 
 
                                                     
47 There are many dispositionalists who are advocates of holism, for example see: Mumford (2004, 182-184); 
Williams (2010, 94-101). 
48 Wilson (manuscript) has argued for strong necessitarianism based on the many-worlds interpretation of 
quantum mechanics and Vetter’s (2015, 276) view also seems to lead to strong necessitarianism. 
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How then does this response fare when a fine-tuning argument is formulated in terms of 
inference to the best explanation? Craig (2008, 161; 2003, 175) provides us with an example 
of a skeleton structure of this type of argument, which he formulates as follows:49 
 
1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either necessity, chance, or design. 
2. It is not due to necessity or chance. 
3. Therefore, it is due to design. 
 
If the necessitarian response is successful then contra Craig, the best explanation will be 
necessity rather than design. I have already given some reasons for thinking necessity a good 
explanation, but no doubt others will give opposing reasons as to why design is better. 
Perhaps one reason for thinking design better is due to objections that can be raised against 
the necessity explanation. I now look at some of these. 
 
One major objection to this view will be, ‘but couldn’t things have been otherwise?’ The first 
thing to say is, yes things could have been otherwise given strong necessitarianism, although 
perhaps not as otherwise as many would like. If we adopt a libertarian view of freedom that 
endorses the principle of alternative possibilities, then it seems the world could have turned 
out different from how it has.50 Sure, all the laws and constants would be the same, but the 
choices made by free agents would produce a different world. Further, certain non-super-
alien properties could have manifested: those that could arise from the set of necessarily 
instantiated properties.51 Yet despite this, strong necessitarians should have no hesitation in 
admitting that possibilities are radically reduced on their view. However, it seems we can 
conceive of possible worlds where the laws or constants of nature are different. What should 
be said in response to this? 
 
Firstly, as the discussion over the differing metaphysics of laws of nature showed, there is 
radical diversity amongst philosophers over what can and can’t be conceived of, and hence 
the range of possibilities there are. For instance, Humeans thought anything could follow 
                                                     
49 Note that Craig inserts ‘physical’ before necessity in his construction, I have removed this since I’m interested 
in metaphysical necessity rather than physical. 
50 Another way one might get this result would be through adopting quantum indeterminism concerning laws, 
which Wilson (2013, 661) takes to be the best form of strong necessitarianism. There are broadly two 
indeterminist pictures one might give. One is a type of multiverse, perhaps given a many worlds interpretation 
of quantum mechanics, which is the type of strong necessitarianism Wilson thinks best (manuscript). The other 
view thinks indeterminism does not give one a multiverse, but rather actuality just traces one of the many 
indeterminist branches that is possible. This latter view however may not be sufficient to block the fine-tuning 
argument, unless the argument is formed that the laws possibly give a life permitting universe rather than 
actually do. This is because the indeterminism of the laws might result in the non-life permitting possibilities of 
the laws, rather than the life permitting possibilities, being realised. 
51 Perhaps one could get further permutations by employing Vetter’s (2015) degreed notion of potentialities and 
formalism. 
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anything.52 Advocates of the strong external governing approach, by contrast, thought one 
could have the same properties with different laws, whilst dispositionalists rejected both of 
these thoughts since a property’s identity doesn’t vary across possible worlds. Ultimately all 
these views cannot be correct, and thus the conclusion to be drawn is that we can’t always 
conceive what we think we can. 
 
Second, we can draw a distinction between types of conceivability as Chalmers has done, such 
that some things are conceivable in some respects but not others. Thus, he distinguishes 
between primary and secondary conceivability, so that it is possible to say “there is a sense 
in which ‘Hesperus is not Phosphorus’ is conceivable, and a sense in which it is not. The first 
of these senses corresponds to primary conceivability, the second to secondary 
conceivability.” (2002, 157) The former of these two, primary conceivability, concerns 
epistemic possibilities, and therefore we can say that it is primary conceivable that the laws 
and constants have been different, just as it is conceivable that Water is not H2O. 
Nonetheless, secondary conceivability is different because it is based on the idea that we hold 
the character of the actual world fixed and “we consider and evaluate counterfactual 
possibilities in the subjunctive mood.” (2002, 158) When conceiving in this way we come to 
see as Kripke did, that “there is no coherently imaginable situation, considered as 
counterfactual, that verifies ‘Hesperus is not Phosphorus’” (2002, 159), and as such this 
possibility it is not secondarily conceivable. It is in this latter respect that dispositionalists 
contend that the laws of nature and constants could not be conceivably different from what 
they are. Thus, there is still a sense in which strong necessitarians can claim the laws and 
constants are conceivably different, but another sense in which they are not. 
 
Nevertheless, some still might contend that it is secondarily conceivable that the laws and 
constants are different. Here it will need to be pointed out that we are often mistaken over 
what we think is conceivable, with one reason for this reason being that isolating our 
conceptions in order to assess them is extremely difficult. For instance, Hume’s idea that he 
could imagine something coming into existence without a cause needs to be isolated from 
other seemingly possible scenarios, such as being teleported or transported, and doing so 
seems extremely difficult.53 Alternatively, it might be the converse that trips us up, in that we 
fail to see things holistically enough so as to see where essential dependencies lie. Our 
conceptual powers also seem in some way dependent upon our knowledge, and hence 
contradictions once hidden become obvious. For example, perhaps we thought that we could 
conceive of a mechanical wave, like a sound wave, being able to travel through a vacuum, but 
after receiving further information we come to see a hidden contradiction between 
mechanical waves and vacuums. Maybe then we think we conceive of the fact that no waves 
can travel through a vacuum, but upon further information we find out there is some type of 
                                                     
52 Although this does not include logically contradictory anythings.  
53 See Anscombe (1981a; 1981b) for further elaboration of this thought regrading Hume. 
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contradiction here too, since electromagnetic waves can.54 Conception then, is always open 
to hidden contradictions coming to light at some further time. All of this is to say that our 
powers of conception are by no means infallible, but actually highly fallible. Wilson makes this 
point well, writing, “whether it is conceivable that like charges attract depends on us, and on 
our conceptual apparatus. Whether the relation between properties and their powers is 
necessary depends not at all on us or on our conceptual apparatus, but on properties and 
powers themselves.” (2013, 664) Put simply, modality neither knows nor cares about our 
conceptual powers, or our seemings.55 
 
This can be seen forcefully in Heil’s remarks about the apparent contingency of the world. He 
writes, “what is it to ‘appear contingent’? What does contingency look like? … [If] all the 
worldly truths [were] absolutely necessary, everything would appear just as it does now. How 
[then] could appearances provide any sort of indication of contingency?” (2013, 171) Thus, 
how things actually are depends not at all on our conceptual apparatus and intuitions, since 
conceivability is a function of how we think. Presumably if we had a different psychological 
make up, or mental powers, we would conceive of things somewhat differently, and perhaps 
end up thinking the world less contingent than many do today. Therefore, if we wanted to 
find out what is truly possible, we would have to overcome the limits of our conceptual 
faculties, somehow transcending them, endowing ourselves with a God-like power. Clearly 
this isn’t possible. But then the question over whether things could have been otherwise, that 
is whether there could have been different dispositions and hence different laws and 
constants, turns out to be one over whether we ought to believe that there could have been, 
the ‘ought’ here being the ‘ought’ of epistemological justification.56 The strong necessitarian 
has given reasons for thinking we ought not think there could have been other laws and 
constants, based on dispositional properties, the principle of sufficient reason, simplicity, and 
modal epistemology. Those who propose design must do likewise, that is give epistemological 
grounds for thinking we, with conceptual powers, are correct in thinking the laws and 
constants of nature are contingent, rather than just assuming it.57 Given that many 
acknowledge that conceivability is unreliable in assessing possibilities (Hill, 2016), this 
objection doesn’t seem to me to be an easy knockout against strong necessitarianism. 
 
Further, we can follow Bird and hypothesise a plausible reason as to why our powers of 
conception are unreliable. He writes, the “link between imagination and possibility is 
explained by the adaptive benefits of such a link … [and given this we] have no reason to 
                                                     
54 Other more metaphysical examples could no doubt be given. 
55 Gendler and Hawthorne (2002, 6) put it like this, “on the face of it, the idea that conceivability is a guide to 
metaphysical possibility is extremely problematic.” 
56 Thanks to Ralph Walker for this point. 
57 Heil makes a similar point, “Why imagine that the idea that the laws could vary requires no defense? The fact, 
if it is a fact, that the laws would have been different, had things been different at the Big Bang, does not imply 
that the laws could have been anything at all.” (2013, 176) 
 18 
suppose that such a link should be reliable in delivering accurate judgements when applied 
to esoteric cases such as the contingency or necessity of laws.” (2004, 274 & 273-275) This 
suggestion seems parallel to the one Plantinga (2011, 307-350) makes in his evolutionary 
argument against naturalism. Plantinga solves the problem by suggesting God has made us in 
such a way that our faculties are aimed at truth, but for the many who don’t think God exists 
or has done this, we might think that this provides us with a further, albeit weak reason, to 
think we are not reliable adjudicators of possibility through conception. 
 
Theists should also be sympathetic to this thought, that we are not reliable adjudicators of 
possibility, since it is something they also emphasise. For instance, many theists think a 
universe consisting of sentient beings who forever suffer horribly and pointlessly against their 
wills is impossible. Yet as Leftow notes, this “makes perfect sense. So it seems to describe a 
genuine possibility.” (2012, 120) But if God necessarily exists and is necessarily omnipotent, 
omniscient, and perfectly good, then this is no genuine possibility, and the same will be true 
for countless other prima facie possibilities given God’s necessary existence. Given this, many 
theists should have little to complain about with the strong necessitarian’s insistence that 
conceivability isn’t a reliable guide to possibility. 
 
Another way to respond to this objection would be to adopt holism, and think everything is 
interdependent (Schaffer, 2010a, 341-376; Williams, 2010). This allows one to reject the 
thought that alternative modal possibilities can arise from free recombination (Armstrong, 
1989). As Schaffer puts it, “A disconnected pluralistic heap should be amenable to free 
recombination; failure of free recombination is thus the modal signature of an interconnected 
… cosmos.” (2010a, 350) Since dispositions are usually thought of as interconnected and 
holistic,58 holism might be seen as a natural consequence of dispositionalism, and therefore 
this way of restricting the modal landscape shouldn’t be seen as costly to dispositionalists, 
but rather exactly what they should expect (Ellis, 2001, 249 & 287; Schaffer, 2010a, 362-365). 
 
However, one might be concerned that this holistic response leads to monism, the view that 
there is only one substance. Suppose this implication is right; should it be considered 
problematic? I think not. One reason is that Schaffer (2009; 2010b; 2010c) has provided some 
plausible arguments to think Monism a viable option. But secondly, many theists shouldn’t 
take monism, at least as Schaffer conceives of it, as problematic since they too make similar 
moves. We can see this by looking at what both mean by substance, and the consequences 
of these definitions. Schaffer defines a substance as “a fundamental and integrated thing. 
[Where] a thing is fundamental if and only if it depends on nothing further, and a thing is 
integrated if and only if it is not an arbitrary gerrymander but displays natural unity” (2013, 
68). Descartes defines substance as, “a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no 
other thing for its existence.” (Principles I. 51 – Cottingham, Stoothoff, & Murdoch, 1988, 177) 
                                                     
58 See note 47. 
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Given these definitions Schaffer concludes that only the cosmos is a substance, whilst 
Descartes deduces there to be “only one substance which can be understood to depend on 
no other thing whatsoever, namely God.” (Principles I. 51 – Cottingham, Stoothoff, & 
Murdoch, 1988, 177) Thus, when one reads that “exactly one substance—one fundamental 
and integrated thing—exists … [where this is] compatible with the existence of any number 
of dependent things” (Schaffer, 2013, 80), theists might be forgiven for thinking their position 
is being described, when in fact it is the entailment of Schaffer’s monist conclusion. Hence, 
both accounts give us only one substance, the cosmos or God.  
 
Nonetheless, both attempt to overcome the implausibility of this conclusion, with Descartes 
allowing for other substances by producing a watered-down notion of substance, writing, “In 
the case of all other substances, we perceive that they can exist only with the help of God’s 
concurrence.” (Principles I. 51 – Cottingham, Stoothoff, & Murdoch, 1988, 177) Schaffer 
makes a similar move, suggesting that for ordinary objects we “replace substance with thing, 
where a thing is a bearer rather than a property, surface rather than paint. A substance is a 
thing that just happens to have some special features, namely fundamentality and 
integration.” (2013, 81)59 As such, both theists and monists seem to hold a similar position 
concerning substances, and give similar answers to its unwanted consequences. Given this, 
some theists need different arguments against the monistic conclusion if they wish to attack 
holism, as they too rely upon similar reasoning when claiming God is the one and only 
fundamental entity. Monism, then, is perhaps not such an easy target. 
 
One might object to strong necessitarianism on other grounds, namely that if the laws and 
constants are metaphysically necessary then scientific methodology of observation and 
experiment might seem unnecessary, with this thought to be an absurd consequence. 
However, the necessitarian will dispute this consequence. The reason for this is that the 
essences of dispositions which account for both the laws and constants are a posteriori 
necessary, and as such empirical investigation is vital to uncovering their nature. Finding out 
the exact nature of a dispositional property is extremely difficult, and so much experiment 
and observation is required in order to do this. Further, it has been argued by some that 
uncovering dispositional properties is what modern science is most suited to do (Cartwright 
& Pemberton, 2013). As such, science is still required and metaphysical theorising from the 
armchair is insufficient.60 
 
Another objection against strong necessitarianism is based upon arguing that necessity is not 
the type of thing that can be attached to property instantiation. One reason often given as to 
why God can be necessary whilst the universe not, is that God can exist in worlds where 
nothing physical exists, since He is incorporeal. By contrast, necessary instantiation, in my 
                                                     
59 Schaffer does this to get rid of the substance category altogether, but one needn’t follow him in that. 
60 In addition to this most of those who advocate strong necessitarianism are philosophers who are very 
informed of, and interested in, accounting for scientific data and its methodology. 
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case, requires that at least some natural dispositional properties are instantiated in every 
world. Perhaps not many properties will be required, especially if there is a reduction of 
current physics into something simpler. Nevertheless, it does seem that some of these 
properties, if they are to explain the laws and constants, must be physical and yet exist 
necessarily. Thus, if there are metaphysically possible worlds where there are no physical 
properties, then the type of properties I require to be necessary cannot be. 
 
Unless the strong necessitarian can come up with an alternative response to this problem, 
they will simply have to bite the bullet, and hold that all possible worlds contain something 
physical.61 Or put another way, there are no metaphysically possible non-physical worlds. 
However, this objection might be less worrying if we make a distinction between atheistic 
strong necessitarianism and theistic strong necessitarianism.62 On the atheistic view, a bullet 
will be bitten, but on the theistic view it need not be. Before explaining why, I answer a worry 
some might have, namely why I am invoking God whilst at the same time critiquing an 
argument to His existence. One shouldn’t be concerned by this since one can object to an 
argument to X even though they think X exists. Indeed, it might even be that because X exists 
and exists in a certain way that they to object to the argument, with this being exactly the 
case here. For the strong necessitarian theist, much like Leibniz and Spinoza, the world and 
its structural features are necessary due to something in the nature of God. Perhaps this 
something is due to His simplicity, or perfection?63 This move should make it clear why I am 
not concerned by an ‘opportunistic theist’ availing the PSR for himself in order to argue for 
God’s existence.64 The reason is simple: the paper is merely questioning whether the fine-
tuning argument is a good one, not whether God exists.65 Given God, the theist can claim that 
there is possibly a non-physical world, but that is only because there is a possible world where 
God does not create.66 If God creates, however, then what He creates will necessarily be 
exactly the same dispositional properties that determine the laws and constants of our world. 
 
This response is also useful in answering another objection alleged against the strong 
necessitarian response, namely that it might seem to provide an answer to the question 
                                                     
61 Heil (2013, 174-176) notes that it is hard for us to imagine a world without space, yet space seems to have 
physical attributes, thus perhaps this bullet isn’t as bad as it might first appear. Further, it might be that orthodox 
first-order logic, which assumes that at least one thing exists, can also come to the aid of those holding this view. 
62 However, combining theism with strong necessitarianism severely limits the modal powers attributable to 
God, such as many of those Leftow (2012) ascribes to God in the most comprehensive study of God’s relation to 
modality. 
63 Perhaps the most influential work on this topic is: Rowe (2004). 
64 Although non-theistic strong necessitarians might want to reject PSR-based reasoning since it might come to 
a theists aid. I should note that only Bird, of the strong necessitarians in the literature, argues for the view based 
on PSR, whilst all others think there are other independent grounds good enough to endorse the view.  
65 Della Rocca (2010) has argued quite persuasively that the PSR leads one to a theistic necessitarianism. 
66 Although this rests on a controversial assumption that God might not create, and this too has been questioned 
by some theists. For instance, see: Kretzmann (1988); O’Connor (2008, 111-129). 
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behind the Leibnizian cosmological argument, ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’ 
This was not my intention, yet the fact that certain properties are necessarily instantiated 
might provide a reply to this argument as well. The theistic strong necessitarian can once 
again claim that the necessity here is conditional on God’s creating, such that the fine-tuned 
laws and constants couldn’t be different from what they are at all, but there could have been 
a world just with God. Hence the Leibnizian question still remains. The other response one 
could give, open to the atheistic or theistic view, is to distinguish between the possibility of 
there being other possible worlds, and the possibility of there being no possible worlds. The 
thought here is that while it is true for strong necessitarians that in every possible world 
certain properties necessarily exist, there is still the possibility of nothing at all existing, where 
this is the possibility of there being no possible worlds. If either of these are correct then the 
Leibnizian question remains. Therefore, strong necessitarians would still have further work to 
do in replying to Leibniz. 
 
A final concern one might raise against the necessitarian view as the best explanation is due 
to thinking that necessities should not be thought of as good explanation stoppers (Leftow, 
2012, 51-54). The worry here is that these necessities seem brute, and some take brute 
necessities to be bad (Dorr, 2004, 2008; Cameron, 2010). For instance, it is thought that asking 
of something that is necessary, why it couldn’t have been otherwise, is not a terrible one 
(Jubien, 2009, 74-75). If a theistic strong necessitarian account is correct then we can see that 
there could be an answer as to why these laws and constants are necessary, namely because 
they bring about the best world and God can only bring about the best. Yet on the atheistic 
account there will be no further explanation as to why necessities hold, rather they are brute. 
However, theists who embrace the design conclusion but also object to the necessitarian 
response on these grounds may find themselves in a predicament. For Chalmers (2002, 189) 
takes it that the necessity of God’s existence is a paradigm case of brute necessity, which 
Plantinga’s (1967, 181-182) earlier comments would seem to bear out. Therefore, those 
theists who follow Plantinga appear to endorse brute necessities, and insofar as they find 
these sufficient explanation stoppers they too should find the strong necessitarian answer 
sufficient also to stop questions of explanation. Otherwise they will be guilty of double 
standards. Alternatively, some have sought to explain God’s necessity, so that it isn’t brute 
(Leftow, 2012, 495-496).67 These explanations, such as God is necessarily a perfect being, 
unfortunately don’t seem applicable to necessary dispositions. As a result, an atheistic strong 
necessitarian must either deny that brute necessities are worrisome,68 as many do, or find a 
way to explain their necessity further. By contrast the theistic strong necessitarian can either 
explain the necessity so that it is no longer brute or follow the atheistic response. 
                                                     
67 However, Leftow (2017, 328-329) does think there is a sense in which God is brute, namely that God is perfect. 
Yet he thinks that God is less brute than naturalism. 
68 To investigate this in detail would take us too far afield into the relationship between explanation and 
modality. 
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Nevertheless, since any form of strong necessitarianism is enough to block the argument this 
worry can be adverted.69 
 
As a result, I think the explanation of strong necessitarianism could plausibly be taken by some 
to be the best explanation in inference to the best explanation versions of the fine-tuning 
argument. I would favour the theistic version out of the two types, atheistic and theistic, but 
could understand why someone might favour the atheistic version, particularly if they have 
what they think are strong independent reasons for thinking God doesn’t exist. I therefore 
suggest it isn’t cut and dried that design is the best explanation here and that necessity, if it 
is a good explanation stopper, seems a viable contender, or at least one theists need to give 
more attention too. 
 
5. Bayesian Fine-Tuning Arguments 
 
The other way the fine-tuning arguments are formulated is in terms of Bayes’s theorem 
(Collins, 2009; Hawthorne and Isaacs, 2017; 2018), where this contrasts with inference to the 
best explanation formulations.70 The argument run this way can be stated as thinking that a 
life permitting universe, which requires fine-tuning, is more likely on theism rather than on 
atheism. As such, the life permitting universe confirms theism over atheism. The question for 
us is whether the necessitarian response is also effective in responding to this type of 
argument. 
 
So to answer this question, it is vital to see that epistemic probabilities are essential for 
understanding the Bayesian approach, where these measure the degree of confidence we 
rationally should have in a proposition. This has a worrisome effect on the necessitarian 
response, since even if these specific laws and constants are metaphysically necessary there 
is no argument for this claim that renders it highly probable or absolutely certain. This is 
because metaphysical necessities do nothing to render epistemic probability claims high or 
certain. This is made obvious when considering identity claims. For instance, Superman is 
Clark Kent. Nonetheless it seems Lois Lane should assign as a low epistemic probability that 
Superman is Clark Kent, even though it is metaphysically necessary that Superman is Clark 
Kent. Given this, the mere fact that the laws and constants are metaphysically necessary does 
nothing to block this form of argument.  
 
This is made clearer when we set out the argument more precisely. Hence take the argument 
for theism based on fine-tuning, where T refers to theism and LPU a life permitting universe, 
to be as follows: 
 
                                                     
69 For other objections and replies to strong necessitarianism, see the papers where it is defended in note 35. 
70 Hawthorne and Isaacs (2018) are critical of explanation versions of the argument compared with probabilistic 
accounts. 
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𝑃(𝑇|𝐿𝑃𝑈) =
𝑃(𝑇) × 𝑃(𝐿𝑃𝑈|𝑇)
𝑃(𝐿𝑃𝑈)
  
 
Put informally this means that the probability of theism given a life permitting universe is 
equal to the probability of theism multiplied by the probability of a life permitting universe 
given theism, divided by the probability of a life permitting universe. Here we are 
conditionalizing the probability of theism on the existence of a life permitting universe, since 
we know there is a life permitting universe as we live in one.71 The place where the 
necessitarian response would come in is in trying to raise the probability of a life permitting 
universe, P(LPU), so to diminish the ratio between a life permitting universe given theism and 
a life permitting universe in general, P(LPU|T)/P(LPU). If it were to do this, then it would 
diminish the confirmation that a life permitting universe gives to theism. We can think of the 
general probability of a life permitting universe, P(LPU), as asking what the probability of 
getting this evidence is in general, where this is understood as a function of all the different 
ways we could get this evidence. For our purposes we only need to plug in two mutually 
exclusive, but exhaustive ways this evidence could come about, one where strong 
necessitarianism holds and the other where it does not.72 Thus, we can understand the 
probability of a life permitting universe, where N refers to strong necessitarianism, as follows: 
     
𝑃(𝐿𝑃𝑈) = 𝑃(𝑁) × 𝑃(𝐿𝑃𝑈|𝑁) + 𝑃(~𝑁) × 𝑃(𝐿𝑃𝑈|~𝑁) 
 
Put informally, the probability of a life permitting universe is equal to the probability of strong 
necessitarianism multiplied by the probability of a life permitting universe given strong 
necessitarianism, plus the probability of strong necessitarianism not holding multiplied by the 
probability of a life permitting universe given strong necessitarianism not holding. What 
needs to be the case to render the probability of a life permitting universe in general high, so 
to diminish the force of the fine-tuning argument, is that something in this formula makes it 
that the general epistemic probability of a life permitting universe is high. Since we are 
considering the necessitarian response we are interested in the first half of the formula. Here 
the necessitarian is likely to claim that P(LPU|N), the probability of a life permitting universe 
given strong necessitarianism is very high, perhaps even 1. Nonetheless, the epistemic 
probability of strong necessitarianism holding seems to be extraordinarily low. As such it does 
nothing to boost the overall probability of a life permitting universe, LPU. For instance, 
suppose the epistemic probability of strong necessitarianism was 0.000001, then given that 
the probability of a life permitting universe on strong necessitarianism is 1, the overall 
probability of this conjunct of the equation for the general probability of a life permitting 
                                                     
71 Since we should only ever conditionalize on the most epistemic certain data, rather than mere possibilities, it 
is therefore highly likely that we should never conditionalise on strong necessitarianism as it will never be the 
most epistemically probable thing available to us in fine-tuning arguments. 
72 These two categories can be split into many further subtypes, but this further division does not concern us 
here. 
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universe is 0.000001. We can see that necessitarian responses will fail similarly for other types 
of data too, and so this is not restricted to fine-tuning arguments. For example, suppose you 
come across some finger prints at a crime scene, you might assign a certain probability for 
them being there in general. One reason they might be there is that the laws of nature make 
it necessary that this finger print be here. As such the probability that the finger print is here 
given these laws of nature is 1, but the epistemic probability that these laws of nature 
necessarily entail this finger print is extraordinarily low. Given all this, we can see that 
metaphysical necessity does nothing to block the Bayesian argument which relies upon 
epistemic probability. Things therefore look grim for the necessitarian on this construal. 
 
What then can the strong necessitarian say in response? One thing they might say is that once 
we see the world is as he claims, then Bayesian reasoning is undercut by necessitarianism, 
since the objective chance of the laws and constants being as they are is in fact 1. This may 
well be epistemically surprising, but any surprise we feel should lapse. Responding to this, 
one might think this a big cost to pay given how prevalent Bayesian reasoning is. However, 
the main problem with this response is that it just doesn’t seem possible that we could know 
with anything close to certainty that strong necessitarianism holds. As a result, the response 
doesn’t even get going. 
 
Another route the strong necessitarian might try is claiming that Bayesian reasoning is 
problematic and so shouldn’t be adopted.73 Whilst some no doubt think this way, it is fair to 
say that it is a minority view and as such will be thoroughly unconvincing for most. Finally, 
perhaps the last hold-out for the strong necessitarian is if there are other devastating 
criticisms particular to the Bayesian formulation of the fine-tuning argument that do not 
plague the best explanation style argument.74 If there are then the Bayesian version will need 
to be dropped for the best explanation formulation. The difficulty here is that the concerns 
which might be brought to bear against the Bayesian version seem also to potentially 
frustrate the inference to best explanation formulation as well. As such the strong 
necessitarian response doesn’t seem to hold up well against Bayesian style fine-tuning 
arguments. At the most, it would seem to provide some reason for increasing our credence’s 
that the laws and constants are necessary. Yet it doesn’t increase these nearly enough for it 
to be problematic. We might therefore suggest that given strong necessitarianism is impotent 
against the fine-tuning argument formulated in Bayesian terms we have another reason, 
along with Hawthorne and Isaac’s criticisms, to prefer this style of argument over the 
inference to the best explanation version. 
 
To conclude this section, suppose we somehow came to know that the laws and constants of 
the universe are as the strong necessitarian supposes. As a result the epistemic probability of 
                                                     
73 For some potential issues see: Easwaran (2011). 
74 For instance: Plantinga (2011, 219-224); Manson (2000); McGrew, McGrew, & Vestrup (2003); McGrew, & 
McGrew (2005). 
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this would be 1, and as Collins writes “epistemic probabilities are only useful in conditions of 
ignorance” (2005, 389) and hence applicable no more since we know the world to be as the 
strong necessitarian claims. Still, we might be able to run an argument for theism based on 
this by asking whether it is likelier on theism than on atheism that there are necessary life 
permitting laws and constants. I suggest it would be likelier on theism than on atheism, 
perhaps for some reasons mentioned above regarding God’s perfection, and hence strong 
necessitarianism of laws and constants confirms theism over atheism.75 The argument will be 
much weaker than the fine-tuning argument, but it is an argument to theism nonetheless. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was to explicate and assess an alternative response to the fine-tuning 
argument. The strong necessitarian’s response to the argument is simple – there couldn’t 
have been any other laws or constants, since the laws and constants are metaphysically 
necessary, and the fine-tuning argument requires that they are contingent. Yet the efficacy 
of this response, as we have seen, depends upon the way the fine-tuning argument is 
formulated. If given in terms of inference to the best explanation I claim the response can be 
potent. Yet when given to a Bayesian formulation of the argument the response seems 
impotent. As such I suggest those formulating fine-tuning arguments should do so in Bayesian 
terms so as to avoid the difficulties of the necessitarian response. 
  
                                                     
75 Or in terms of inference to the best explanation: the best explanation of the necessity of the laws and 
constants is God. 
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